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RUIN PHILOSOPHY, POETIC DISCOURSE AND THE COLLAPSE OF 
META-NARRATIVES IN ALEKSANDR KUSHNER’S POETRY OF THE 
1970s  
Andreas Schönle (QMUL) 
Abstract 
This article offers an analysis of the trope of ruin in the poetry of Aleksandr Kushner 
(born 1936), in particular through a close reading of two of his poems: “In a slippery 
graveyard, alone” and “Ruins”. The analysis of these poems is preceded by an overview 
of ruin philosophy from Burke and Diderot to Simmel and Benjamin, with particular 
emphasis on the way the trope of ruin contemplation stages a confrontation between the 
self and what transcends it (death, history, nature, etc.). This philosophical background 
serves as a heuristic tool to shed light on the poetry of Kushner. Through the trope of 
ruin, Kushner explores the legitimacy of poetic speech after the collapse of all meta-
narratives. Kushner has no truck with Diderot's solipsism, nor with Hegel's bold 
narrative of progress, nor with Simmel's peaceful reconciliation with the creative forces 
of nature. Nor, really, does he intend to bear witness to history, the way Benjamin does 
in the faint anticipation of some miracle. Instead, Kushner posits the endurance of a 
community united not around a grand project, but around the idea of carrying on in the 
face of everything, muddling through despite the lack of hopes for a transformational 
future and making the most of fleeting moments of positivity that emerge out of the 
fundamental serendipity of history. 
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What is a ruin? By definition, this artefact resists neat delimitation as it results from the 
decomposition and disintegration of a prior object. Reference to common sense usage 
suggests that a ruin must present signs of decay, although loosely speaking, well-
preserved abandoned buildings can also be called ruins for rhetorical effect. Nor is the 
absence of practical use a necessary condition, for suitably secured ruins have been 
pressed into new uses, whether as memorial churches (in Coventry or Berlin, for 
example), or as exhibition spaces. How much of an object must be preserved before it 
stops being a ruin and turns into mere rubble? This, too, is a matter of debate, and 
archaeologists, preservationists, art historians, and political leaders will likely disagree 
about the line separating ruin and rubble. How authentic does a ruin need to be to deserve 
our attention? The proliferation of reconditioned ruins, not to speak of outright fakes (the 
sham ruins in landscape gardens, for example, which in themselves became valuable 
artefacts), makes such a determination highly problematic. The ruin is always a work in 
progress, the result of various interventions (or lack thereof), so it never achieves a 
primordial, authentic state. Indeed, ruins are processes as much as objects. In certain 
historical situations, the difference between ruin and ruination becomes immaterial. In 
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the light of the debates about the conversion of post-Fordist industrial ruins, it is not even 
clear how old a ruin needs to be to qualify as such. In short, the ruin is a cultural construct, 
more than a physical object. It is, in a true sense, in the eye of the beholder. 
The cultivation of ruins reveals a paradoxical affinity with modernity.1 Ruins began to 
be perceived and preserved as ruins during the Renaissance, when the awareness of 
historical discontinuities exemplified by the demise of ancient civilizations raised the 
status of traces from the past. Ruins became particularly important during the 
Enlightenment, as the historical consciousness of the age, inspired by the ideology of 
progress, transformed ruins into ambivalent signs — at once superseded and yet still 
desired — of the advance of societies. At the same time, ruins resulting from wars and 
natural catastrophes complicated providentialist notions of history and conjured up the 
vision of a universe abandoned by God. The beginning of systematic excavations at 
Pompeii and Herculaneum raised awareness about the value of ruins. In the nineteenth 
century, in the context of the rise of historicism, the fantasy took hold that through ruins, 
one could reconstruct the past in its totality. This led to the practice of notional 
reconstruction evidenced, for example, by the work of Viollet-le-Duc. Subsequently, the 
fate of ruins became tightly linked to changing views of heritage preservation. Yet at the 
same time, political investment in ruins, notably in the imperial context, where the 
treatment, or plundering, of the ruins of colonial countries reinforced notions of historical 
advancement and civilizational superiority, proceeded unabated. By the beginning of the 
20th century, ruins began to be seen in a more philosophical sense as ciphers of 
temporality. The works of John Ruskin, Alois Riegl and others laid the ground for a better 
recognition of the “age value” of a monument, of the significance of its accretion of traces 
of various historical periods, which should be preserved, rather than sanitized -- ideas 
which eventually were formalized in the Venice Charter for the Conservation and 
Restoration of Monuments and Sites in 1964. In Western societies, ruins became unique 
lieux de mémoire, which contributed greatly to the consolidation of national identity. 
Now, ruins have become obligatory destinations of the tourist industry, and their 
contemplation is part and parcel of our post-modern, or super-modern, mass culture.2 
In Russia ideas about the importance of preserving ruins have been slower to take on 
and the state has played a comparatively greater role in either destroying ruins or ordering 
their complete reconstruction. Through a series of case studies, I have attempted 
elsewhere to analyse the reasons for this state of affairs and to shed light on the way ruins 
could therefore play a kind of counter-cultural role at various historical junctures. 3 
Suffice it to say that rulers have tended to view the urban fabric as a reflection of their 
governance and have therefore undertaken energetic interventions in its design and 
development, which therefore exposed ruins to political projects they could hardly be 
                                                 
1 By modernity I mean a worldview that sweeps aside traditional moral and political representations, 
institutes a rupture with the past, and defines the present as a transition toward the future. The first 
philosophical conceptualization of this new sense of time belongs to Hegel. See Habermas 1987 1-22. For 
a thorough discussion of the meaning of “modern” through the ages, see Gumbrecht 1978 93-131. For a 
discussion of the various strands of modernity, including the contradictions and intensity of Russia’s 
embrace thereof, see Berman 1982.  
2 For a recent overview of the history of heritage preservation, see Miles Glendinning, The 
Conservation Movement: A History of Architecture Preservation (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013). For the 
concept of supermodernity, see Augé 1995. 
3 A more extensive analysis of the “ruin philosophy” can be found in Schönle 2011 8-17.  
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immune from. But as a result, the ruin became a trope through which writers, artists, and 
thinkers could articulate their views of the relationship between the subject, space, 
history, and the state. 
This article will consider the trope of the ruin in the poetry of Aleksandr Kushner, born 
1936, a Leningrad/Petersburg poet who has not yet received the critical attention he 
deserves. I will focus in particular on his poetry of the 1970s, the time of so-called 
stagnation, when history in the Soviet Union seemed to have ground to a halt. To shed 
light on the resonance of the ruin in Kushner’s poetry of the 1970s, I will juxtapose this 
trope with some of the main philosophical conceptions of the ruin elaborated since the 
eighteenth century. This is of course not an argument about influence in any measurable 
way. References to the Western philosophy of the ruin will serve as a set of critical tools 
or markers, which will help put Kushner’s poetry in a larger conceptual field. I am not 
even claiming that Kushner had direct knowledge of the philosophical corpus I will 
utilize, only that his own ideas present analogies and contrasts with it, which will allow 
me to set Kushner’s poetry in a vicarious dialogue with it. By drawing on this body of 
thought, we can better understand Kushner’s idiosyncratic position. 
Let us start with Edmund Burke, who offered a striking apology of the ruin from a 
conservative standpoint. In his Philosophical Inquiry into the Origins of our Ideas of the 
Sublime and the Beautiful, Burke meditates on the fact that although nobody would desire 
the destruction of London, “the pride of England and of Europe,” people would delight 
in the spectacle of its destruction if it were to take place (Burke 1998 94). “There is no 
spectacle we so eagerly pursue, as that of some uncommon and grievous calamity; so that 
whether the misfortune is before our eyes, or whether they are turned back to it in history, 
it always touches with delight,” he adds (Burke 1998 93). Burke explains our enjoyment 
of ruins through a particular disposition towards compassion, “the bond of sympathy,” 
which God instilled in us in order to unite society. The delight we experience from the 
grief of others draws us to such spectacles, while the uneasiness and pain we feel from 
identification with the victims prompt us to offer them relief. The mixed feelings inspired 
by ruins are indispensable for social cohesion. For otherwise, in keeping with Burke's 
sensualism, if ruins generated only unpleasant ideas, they would turn us off, which would 
undermine solidarity and lead to the atomization of society. Interestingly, both real and 
imaginary destruction are equally capable of inciting our compassion, and the more 
underserved the suffering, the keener our pleasure. For ruins are less historical artefacts, 
than instruments of social engineering, and the more shocking they are, the greater their 
effect. In short, ruins are a grand spectacle engineered by history in order to foster social 
cohesion. The spectacle of ruins can be seen as the keystone of Burke's philosophical 
construction in that it redirects self-preservation into a communal aspiration and thus 
unifies the person and society. Naïve as it may seem at first glance, Burke’s 
rationalization of the ruin captures its possible effect as the cornerstone of an imagined 
community. Historian Peter Fritzsche, for example, described how the ruins of medieval 
castles on the Rhine, re-discovered by German Romantics during the Napoleonic 
occupation, contributed to the invention of a shared history and thus to the rise of German 
nationalism (Fritzsche 2004 92-130).  
Denis Diderot owed much to Burke's theory of the ruin, though he deployed it to 
opposite ends. In his Salon of 1767, he accepted Burke's notion of the pleasure we take at 
the misfortunes of others, yet without Burke's providentialist justification thereof, 
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referring instead simply to the beauty and usefulness of the compassion we experience at 
the sight of some calamity. His foremost purpose was to demonstrate how the art of his 
time constitutes the individual subjectivity of the beholder. To him, art invites the 
spectators to step into the painting and absorb themselves into the landscape depicted, 
illustrating the power of the imagination to move across spatial and temporal boundaries 
and instilling an exhilarating feeling of freedom (Fried 1980 122-131). Ultimately the 
contemplation of art turns into an introspective reverie, the discovery of "the pleasure of 
belonging to myself, the pleasure of knowing myself to be as good as I am, the pleasure 
of seeing myself and of pleasing myself, the even sweeter pleasure of forgetting myself."4 
Ruins are uniquely capable of inspiring these flights of the imagination and of constituting 
a subjectivity that society otherwise holds in check. Although they evoke the great 
levelling ubiquity of death, ruins allow the self “to make a solitary stand,” poised at the 
edge of “a torrent” that “drags each and every nation into the depths of a common abyss.” 
A ruin “delivers us up to our inclinations,” Diderot says, as time and death denigrate the 
importance of societies and nations. On the site of a ruin, he adds,  
I’m freer, more alone, more myself, closer to myself. It’s there that I call out to 
my friend, it’s there that I miss my friend; it’s there that we’d enjoy ourselves 
without anxiety, without witnesses, without intruders, without those jealous of 
us. It’s there that I probe my own heart; it’s there that I interrogate [hers], that I 
take alarm and reassure myself” (Diderot 1995 2: 199)  
Ruins emancipate us from social constraints, free our senses and desires, and enable 
introspection. Even more poignantly, they invite us to relive in the absence of the lover 
“the same intoxication that had so completely and deliciously possessed our senses” 
(Diderot 1995 2: 200) An emblem of transience, ruins in fact afford an imaginary 
repetition of the past similar in intensity to the original sensations it elicited, abolishing 
objective time. Diderot seems to imply that it is precisely on account of the fleetingness 
of life that ruins foster imaginary pleasures, which allow us to “make a solitary stand” 
against time and decay. His philosophy gives expression to an individualistic, subjective, 
and contrarian experience of the ruin, one which can explain the fascination it has exerted 
over many individuals who felt trapped in history. 
For the sake of contrast, let us now turn to Hegel. Hegel represents the opposite stance, 
for he invoked reasons of state to justify the production, rather than the contemplation of 
ruins and he mounted a frontal critique of the aestheticization of ruins. In his Lectures on 
the Philosophy of History, Hegel famously developed his idea of the dialectical process 
by which reason, the essence of the world, comes to itself. Yet Hegel is keenly aware that 
his thesis about the rational basis of history is deeply counter-intuitive. He underscores 
the fact that the view of the demise of once prosperous kingdoms throws us into “moral 
affliction” (moralische Betrübniss) and can only lead to fatalism and to withdrawal “into 
the selfishness that stands on the quiet shore” [in die Selbstsucht zurücktreten, welche am 
ruhigen Ufer steht] (Hegel 1970 12: 34-35).5 
                                                 
4 Translation from Fried 1980 126. 
5Text translated by J. Sibree, available at 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/hiconten.htm 
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Hegel seems to polemicize with Burke and Diderot and through them with 
philosophical sensualism. The contemplation of the ruins of history can provoke only 
negative feelings, “hopeless sadness,” which nothing can assuage and which ultimately 
force us to step back and distance ourselves from ruination. Hegel is deeply suspicious of 
sentimental meditation, which to him serves only “to gain a gloomy pleasure from the 
sublime but fruitless feeling of ineluctability” (Hegel 1970 12: 38). Hegel clearly rejects 
the pre-romantic cultivation of mixed feelings that Burke initiated with his theory of the 
social value of ruins.  
Now Hegel fights the aestheticization of ruins because he is deeply suspicious of its 
nostalgic component. In a different passage, Hegel remarks that the aestheticization of 
ruins prompts us to associate negative feelings with historical change. In fact, however, 
ruins ought to instil confidence in the strength of the spirit, which continuously discards 
old forms in its progress toward self-realization:  
But the next consideration, which allies itself with that of change, is that change, 
while it imports dissolution, involves at the same time the rise of a new life — 
that while death is the issue of life, life is also the issue of death. […] Spirit — 
consuming the envelope of its existence — does not merely pass into another 
envelope, nor rise rejuvenescent from the ashes of its previous form; it comes 
forth exalted, glorified, a purer spirit. It certainly makes war upon itself [. . . ] 
but each successive phase becomes in its turn a material, working upon which it 
exalts itself to a new grade. (Hegel 1970 12: 98) 
Thus destruction, including self-destruction, is an intrinsic component of dialectical 
change, and it is hence as ineluctable as it is necessary. The advance of reason produces 
its ruins, but ruins that signal not external contingencies, but the Spirit’s self-
transcendence. The ruin, here, is less a static spectacle than a dynamic process, a reminder 
for people of their mortality, which prompts them to identify with the state and dedicate 
all their efforts to its empowerment, as Hegel advances in his Principles of the Philosophy 
of Law in the context of his notoriously controversial discussion of the “happy war.” 
Hegel refers in various places to the metaphor of the wind, which moves the seas and 
keeps them healthy, just like wars prevent people from hardening in their petty everyday 
life, confined to a deadening stasis (Hegel 1970 7: 492-3). The wind, likewise, is what 
moves ships forward, thus enabling the journey of the spirit in its progress from the east 
to the west. For Hegel the only genuine individual is the state, and the state requires that 
its citizens relinquish their autonomy, including the intimate pleasures of aesthetic 
contemplation, and exert themselves on behalf of a common purpose. Hegel would have 
set even less store by Diderot’s staunchly individualistic, escapist, and eroticized 
enjoyment of ruins. 
In the end, then, Hegel, too, ascribes to ruins a collective, social significance, just like 
Burke, but with the difference that he substitutes a progressive philosophy of history to 
Burke’s conservative evocation of the ruin as an awe-inspiring spectacle.  In both cases, 
however, the ruin is instrumentalized. If for Burke the ruin gains meaning through the 
compassion it inspires in the spectator, in Hegel the ruin gives rise to a philosophical view 
of existence, which is predicated on inner distancing from the immediate experience of 
loss.  
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Hegel’s disdain for the contemplation of ruins forms the background for Georg 
Simmel’s turn-of-the-century celebration of the ruin. In his famous 1907 essay “On the 
ruin. An aesthetic experiment,” the German sociologist writes of the profoundly peaceful 
effect of ruins (Simmel 1993 124-130).6 Although the ruin seems to signal the revenge of 
nature on the strivings of human agency, in reality the ruin returns us to the source of our 
energy, to the core of our self, in which nature and human reason share their common 
root. How is this possible? The ruin of a building indicates that nature develops new 
strengths, which it grafts onto an old structure, thus creating new forms, a new unity, in 
which the creative spirit of humanity co-exists with the continuous becoming of nature. 
The ruin thus is a window into the future as it demonstrates that an object continues to 
exist and to develop even after it has been subjected to “rape” when it was given a specific 
form by man. The ruin is not equivalent to decay, as it creates a “new form” and “a new 
meaning.” Much like Hegel, Simmel rises against existential stagnation, but if Hegel 
credits the spirit with the ability to transcend itself, for Simmel it is the creative energy 
of nature that is the agent of change. The novelty created by the ruin differs from Hegel’s 
synthesis in that in it, the conflicting elements retain “the autonomous logic of their 
forces” (Simmel 1993 125). In bringing into balance “the conflict between intention and 
chance, nature and spirit, the past and the present,” the ruin creates a sort of “equalizing 
justice” (Simmel 1993 129-30). As a result it acquires a face “that is stable in its forms 
and endures peacefully” (Simmel 1993 128-29). Simmel is clearly interested in relatively 
well-preserved ruins. 
We find the ruin attractive not merely because it betokens a conflict between humanity 
and nature, but also because it reveals our inner contradictions. Simmel’s concept of 
nature also refers to our internal pulsions, which the process of civilization subjects more 
and more to the control of reason. Thus, in vindicating nature, the ruin valorises the 
creative potential of human instincts, their endurance and necessary role in history. The 
ruin returns us to ourselves, cures our alienation, suggests the “peaceful unity of 
belonging” (Dazugehören). It instils in us a taste for the “unfinished, the formless, and 
for that which breaks frames.” The beauty of the ruin does not stifle the consciousness of 
the viewer, on the contrary it releases its unconscious energy and thus exerts a liberating 
effect. The Nietzschean overtones in this language are unmistakable. Unlike with Burke 
or Hegel, the ruin illustrates not the necessity of the state and of society, but the legitimacy 
of our own desires. In his discussion of the return to mother nature, Simmel seems to echo 
Sigmund Freud’s notion of the ruin as the archaeology of the unconscious (Freud 2003 
231). But where Freud detects the complex consequences of psychological repression, 
Simmel lays emphasis on the creative dimension of such a return. The important idea to 
retain for us here, is the notion that ruins have the ability to unlock powerful subconscious 
energies. 
Walter Benjamin’s seminal The Origins of Baroque Drama further radicalizes the anti-
Hegelian and anti-social import of ruins. For him ruins are famously the material analogue 
of the collapse of metaphysical systems (Benjamin 1998 177-78). As in Hegel, the ruin 
emblematizes history, but as the manifestation not of the advance of reason, but of a 
perpetual tumbling out of a state of unity, a process of continuous decay and atomization. 
Nature here is seen as a continuous process of decay, rather than a Simmelian creative 
                                                 
6 There is an English translation of the version of the essay Simmel reworked in 1911; see Simmel 
1965 259-66. 
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force. In its haphazard nature, the ruin signals modernity’s inability to conceive a totality, 
as well as the aesthetic superiority of destruction over beauty. The baroque artist, and by 
implication the modernist one as well, can do no more than to pile up fragments and 
shards, without clear idea of the goal and in expectation of a miracle. The ruin thus reveals 
both the utterly meaningless regime of contingency we live in, and the irrational need we 
experience for redemption. To transpose Benjamin’s discourse into a less metaphysical 
language we could say that the ruin indicates the collapse of structures of identity that 
had enabled us to imagine ties with fellow human beings, across time and space, and to 
think of the present as a meaningful link between the past and the future. Instead, we have 
the reign of random events and arbitrary juxtapositions, which could only be made 
meaningful with the intervention of a transcendent force. 
Benjamin returns to the image of the ruin in his later “Theses on the Philosophy of 
History.” Referring to the painting “Angelus Novus” by Paul Klee, Benjamin describes 
an “angel of history” aghast at the sight of a “single catastrophe, which keeps piling 
wreckage upon wreckage” (Thesis IX) (Benjamin 1968, 257). This angel is even more 
helpless than the baroque artist: however much he would want “to awaken the dead, and 
make whole what has been smashed” [die Toten wecken und das Zerschlagene 
zusammenfügen], he is drawn against his will backwards toward the future, swept by the 
wind of progress. Burke’s instinctual sympathy is thus defeated. This passage evidently 
conveys the impossibility of the miracle the baroque artist had hoped for. The wind, which 
nullifies the angel’s desire to provide assistance to humanity, harks back, of course, to the 
Hegelian wind, which moves ships across the oceans towards a more rational future. In 
Benjamin’s view, Hegel’s teleological idealism is inextricably conducive to decay, rather 
than to progress. 
The angel is at once within and outside of history, at the fleeting intersection between 
teleological and eschatological conceptions of history. He anticipates an eschatological 
catastrophe, but he lacks a stable foothold, a “shore” from which to contemplate history, 
a transcendent leverage point, and is himself engulfed by historical becoming. Thus 
progress and decay are interlaced, negating and strengthening each other at the same time. 
The best the angel can do is to document the historical destruction he has captured with 
his eyes before he is swept away. We could read this as a metaphor of the materialist 
historian à la Benjamin, who goes against the historical grain by responding with weak 
messianic force to the past’s need for redemption (thesis 2), unlike traditional historicism, 
which reflects the point of view of the winner and obfuscates ruination (Benjamin 1968 
254, 257). In short, however senseless, the role of the historian is akin to that of the 
baroque artist, namely to bear witness to ruins in the faint hope of redemption. This 
philosophy hardly provides a stable moral platform upon which to support political 
activity, and in recent discussions of Benjamin’s philosophy of history, scholars have 
tended to put the emphasis on its philosophical hopelessness, which ultimately led to 
Benjamin’s suicide (see Maeseneer 2003 511-27). 
We can thus see how the theory of ruin has moved from a confident assertion of the 
social significance of ruins to a much more despondent sense that ruins speak of the 
ineluctable decay that governs history, a reversal of Hegel’s confident sea-faring narrative 
of progress. Obviously much has been left out, from Horace Walpole in the eighteenth 
century to Adorno, Baudrillard, Žižek and most recently Augé in the 20th and 21st. It has 
become apparent in these theories that the ruin is instrumentalized and allegorized. It was 
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invoked to strengthen the social fabric, to ground the subjectivity of the self, to foster the 
advance of the spirit, or to legitimize the rejection of teleology. Even in Benjamin, the 
ruin points beyond itself, to a metaphysical condition presumed universal and what W.G. 
Sebald subsequently called the “natural history of destruction” (Sebald 2003). But do we 
not do violence to the ruin when we attempt to compress it into a metaphysical conception 
that it has no knowledge of? Does the wind that erodes the ruin blow from the faraway 
reaches of universal history or is it the result of local weather conditions? 
This brief philosophical survey will enable us to discern the distinctiveness of 
Kushner’s deployment of the ruin. One of Kushner's main statements about space, time, 
and decay takes the form of an implicit response to the poetic sensibility of the Romantic 
poet of Fedor Tiutchev. “Na skol'zkom kladbishche, odin” (“In a slippery graveyard, 
alone”), published in 1978, stages a visit to Tiutchev's grave on the Novodevich’e 
cemetery in St Petersburg, which is described as a seemingly abandoned graveyard, full 
of broken tombstones and ruins, as well as rotten trees (“Na skol'zkom kladbishche, 
odin”, Golos, Kushner 1997 176-77).7 Standing at his grave, the poet references several 
of Tiutchev's poems, using key words from his poetic idiom: “all-absorbing abyss,” “light 
from elsewhere,” “chaos,” these terms allude intertextually to some of Tiutchev's most 
famous poems, such as "Day and Night," "A Dream on the Sea," and others. Without 
going into details, suffice it to say that Kushner evokes, but rejects Tiutchev's variously 
connotated binary worldview, whereby this world is but a brief vision, dream, or 
appearance that promptly lapses into a primordial chaos or infinity. In Tiutchev’s “Ot 
zhizni toi, chto bushevala zdes'” ("Of the Life that Rages Here”), all that remains from 
history are a few burial mounds, which serve as fertile ground for oak trees to grow 
“boldly” and in complete indifference to the memory of the person who rests among their 
roots. Nature is not only unmoved by the travails of humanity, it actively swallows all its 
“children,” regardless of their “pointless heroic deeds,” into its “all-absorbing and 
peaceful chaos” (“Poocheredno vsekh svoikh detei, / Svershaiushchikh svoi podvig 
bespoleznyi, / Ona ravno privetstvuet svoei / Vsepogloshaiushchei i mirotvornoi bezdnoi” 
(Tiutchev 1987 261). And yet in Tiutchev's poem, this lapse into the indeterminate 
primordial sphere is perceived as “instilling peace” (mirotvornyi). In other words, beyond 
humanity's quest for individuation, there is a longing to merge with the immensity of 
nature, which death and forgetting provide. This poem, written in 1871, clearly indexes a 
sensibility that is also at the heart of Simmel's theory of the ruin. As we saw it, Simmel 
speaks of the "peaceful unity of belonging" to which we return when we absorb ourselves 
in contemplation of the ruin. This is a return into the embrace of nature, which acts with 
"equalizing justice," much like here the "peace-inspiring abyss treats everyone the same."  
Now Kushner disputes this binary tension between individuality and surrounding 
primordial nature or chaos. To him, there is nothing behind, beneath or beyond this world. 
What there is, instead, is simply decay, the residues and detritus of history, which he 
describes as “the obsolete rubbish of swept-off years, simply a dump.” The ubiquity of 
decay, so vividly embodied in Leningrad’s crumbling graveyards, of course also indexes 
the state of Soviet society in the 1970s, when the lack of social progress dashed hopes of 
meaningful change. The decrepit cemeteries are furthermore both “a rejection of life and 
a rejection / of death.” They exist in the interval between life and death, or in their 
                                                 
7 References to Kushner will indicate the title of the poem, the collection to which it belongs, and the 
edition I used. 
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indistinguishability.8 Contrary to Tiutchev's mighty oaks, trees are also rotting away, just 
like human artefacts. Nature does not offer an eternal haven, nor a powerful alternative 
to human life. It is caught in a similar process of decay, rather than creation. Nor is death 
a grand moment that can be immortalized: “Does haughtiness grace the dead? Is humility 
in poetry insincere?” In the light of the ubiquity of decay, life and death become 
inseparable, yet without evoking any sense of tragedy.  
This acceptance of loss makes the burden of responding to the cruelty of twentieth-
century history only more problematic, as it could lead to an endorsement of historical 
violence. Can the poet bear witness to the violence of history? Does he face an intractable 
ambivalence similar to that of Benjamin's Angel? The poet concedes that “A hundred of 
our years / Can surpass the destruction / Of a millennium: so many catastrophes / Have 
fallen, bombs, which have switched off the lights / Devastating night calls.” The use of 
the first person plural (“A hundred of our years”) signals that the poet acknowledges his 
participation and co-responsibility in causing such misery. But instead of bearing witness, 
he explores the possibility of oblivion, of self-cancellation. The call to use a rubber to 
erase “our” lines implies an act of self-denial and atonement that undermines the self-
confidence of poetic expression. In any case, the response to decay is emphatically not 
one of aestheticization: “After all, we wouldn't grow pretty flowers / On these remains 
and rubble!” There is no conceivable way in which solipsistic pleasure could compensate 
for historical violence, contrary to what Diderot had implied. Kushner comes close to the 
radical anti-aestheticism of Adorno in his famous statement that one can no longer write 
poetry in the aftermath of the Holocaust. Yet the very poetic form of Kushner's assertion 
about the impossibility of poetry belies or at least qualifies his pronouncement. Similarly, 
the image of the dead Tiutchev discreetly assenting to his own loss through “eternal sleep” 
rests on the paradox that he remains sufficiently alive to express his feelings for worldly 
affairs. In short, Kushner's poem invokes Tiutchevian antinomies—life and death, world 
and chaos, day and night, speech and silence—in order to turn them inward against one 
another. They become opposite poles through which the poet muddles, cutting a 
paradoxical, aimless path. For us, the main dimension of this paradox is the foregrounding 
of decay and dilapidation as the only site of authenticity, precisely because of its 
paradoxical nature. The “interrupted singing / Of two-three bird's phrases” is the poetic 
equivalent of this muddling through decay: haphazard, discontinuous shreds of poetic 
language, breaking through the muteness of destruction, are all that can remain. 
Referring to Tiutchev's grave, the poem briefly alludes to a more typical stance: "If it 
was not Tiutchev, perhaps/ They would have ploughed it over. / Our entire character is in 
this/ And our rapture." But the poem leaves no doubts as to the vanity of such thrilling 
attempts to start life anew and throw the past overboard. This poem thus dismisses the 
modernist aspiration for a new beginning as a fleeting intoxication. Hegel's advance of 
the spirit, embodied in the state, is no more than an illusion. There are no historical 
                                                 
8 A variant of this poetics of the interval can be found in the verses “Life is finished, but death doesn’t 
know yet / About it. How shall we use this pause?” (“Zhizn’ konchilas’, a smert’ eshche ne znaet / Ob 
etom. Pauzu na chto upotrebim?”) (from “Zhizn’ konchilas’, a smert’ eshche ne znaet,” Tavricheski sad, 
Kushner 1997 237). For Andrei Ar’ev, “the whole of [Kushner’s, A.S.] poetry is in this pause, and this 
pause is poetry” (Ar’ev 2000 112). See also the poem “Lace”, in which the gaps or openings between the 
threads, this “airy element” (“vozdushnaia stikhiia”) become a metaphor for poetry and love 
(“Kruzhevo,” Golos, Kushner 1997 186). 
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masterplots, indeed no predetermination. As Kushner puts it in another poem, things 
happen “in excess of the programme . . . / By virtue of the lucky weakness of fate” 
(“sverkh programmy . . . / Po schastlivoi slabosti sud’by”) (“Vse, chto dal’she, kak by 
sverkh programmy,” Priamaia rech’, Kushner 1997 153) Instead, the only form of 
existence the poem envisions is that of rambling among the back alleys of sepulchral 
fields, dressed “not in purple, but in tatters.” There is no Elysian afterlife to aspire for as 
humanity is doomed to roaming among the vestiges of history, not as a king or god, but 
as a vagrant. The poem thus conveys a sense of living in the aftermath of a calamitous 
history, without a sense of direction and purpose, without hope from the future, yet with 
a sense that in accepting decay, we come to terms with the paradoxical tensions of the 
human condition.  
I will now briefly take up another poem by Kushner, published in the same collection 
in 1978 under the title of “Ruins” (Golos, Kushner 1997 159-160). The poem initially 
describes the creation of fake neo-classical ruins in gardens of the Russian aristocracy. It 
indexes an elegiac sensibility, which paradoxically recovers in mourning about the 
transience of life a sense of its fullness (“For complete bliss only ruins /were missing...”). 
This is, again, not unlike the aestheticized enjoyment of the ruin promoted by Diderot, 
the pleasurable absorption with one's own solipsistic feelings and the power of one's 
subjectivity. But the erection of these ruins also reveals a cultural project, the 
westernization of a social group that has its roots in the East: “Among the diluted darkness 
of the North, / Rose the mirage of Mycenea and the Parthenon / The powdered descendant 
of Tatar hordes / Revered Felten and Cameron.” Charles Cameron was a Scottish architect 
invited to Russia by Catherine the Great and Iurii Felten was a Russian architect who also 
worked for the court. Both adopted a neo-classical idiom, and contributed to re-fashioning 
imperial estates according to the latest western, Palladian fashion. In referring to these 
two architects, one foreign and one Russian, Kushner indexes the eighteenth-century state 
project of creating a westernized elite as a way to help Russia catch up with other 
European countries in its historical development. In other words, fake classical ruins here 
serve the project of overcoming Russia's delayed modernization, a Hegelian endeavour, 
one could say, only that this project also involves contemplating the ruined remnants of 
classical civilization, which provide a model of imperial grandeur.    
But now the poem flashes forward to the devastation of World War Two and the poet's 
memories of the ruins he witnessed as a child, contrasting this pervasive landscape of 
destruction with the aestheticized infatuation with ruins of the eighteenth century. The 
ruins of World War Two are anthropomorphised as a “stiff face of grief without 
expression,” in other words the ruins paradoxically evoke a human face so thoroughly 
dehumanized that it has lost expressiveness. In the face of this calamitous experience, the 
poet firmly rejects any possibility of aestheticizing the ruins: “Let others admire, / How 
elder blooms among the devastation.” The collapse of buildings is likened to the sudden 
implosion of “former ideals” and old friendships, to amorous partings, desperation and 
disappointments, giving the ruins a much broader meaning as an index of the breakdown 
of all hopes the past had placed in the future. This utter calamity makes human beings 
into ruins and leaves them without a clear place in life, as neither home nor travel provide 
any relief (“And even the home is repellent to the ravaged son / And there is no oblivion 
in departures”). For the children of this history, such as Kushner (born in 1936) to a 
certain extent is, we could say, there is no possibility of belonging to this world any more. 
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And yet this state of affairs does not lapse into unremitting gloom, as the poet hints at the 
possibility of rescuing some scraps of meaning: “My friends, hold on to the railings, / To 
this bush, to paintings, to a line, / To the best, we had in life/ To the inconsistency of 
misery and interruption.” Not only does the poet reaffirm the existence of friendship, 
which had been denied before. History does not seem to follow a stringent masterplan, 
and among the diversity of phenomena, including the world of the arts and the workings 
of memory, one can grasp at some tenuous hold onto life. Indeed, it is precisely the 
vagaries of history that present a tiny spark of hope. As the poet puts it, “We know where 
to find the ruins: in the past. / And the future, perhaps, is beside the point” (ni pri chem).  
In other words, the future is not in any way restricted or closed off by the past. There is 
always the possibility of unpredictable novelty or inconsistency, which is, perhaps, worth 
living. Andrei Ar’ev places this interest in the unexpected trifle in the context of 
Kushner’s rejection of Romanticism, of any sort of spirituality, mysticism or ineffability 
of the subjective sphere (Ar’ev 2000 112). In short, it is in the sense of the future's 
contingency, of the randomness of life, of history's lack of purpose and continuity, that 
the poet identifies some reason to carry on living despite the heavy burden of the past. 
And the openness of the future translates into the changeability of space. In a poem 
devoted to mutations in the landscape, the poet writes “And you know, even glad / I am: 
our world / Is not a reserve; its shape / Is fickle; the gaps / Cannot be patched; but then / 
It is newish for those / Who drew in the loto / Their number after us, / Whose whispering 
and laughter / You hear in the late hour.” (“I znaesh’, dazhe rad / Ia etomu: nash mir — / 
Ne zapovednik; sklad / Ego izmenchiv; dyr / Ne zalatat’; zato / Novekhonek dlia tekh, / 
Kto vytashchil v loto / Svoi nomer pozzhe nas, / Chei shepotok i smekh / ty slyshish’ v 
pozdnii chas.’) (“Poseshchenie,” Golos, Kushner 1997 183).  
In short, taken together, the two poems I have briefly analysed delineate a stance of 
carrying on despite the collapse of all illusions, whether those are about the existence of 
another life or the pursuance of a civilizational project such as westernization or 
modernization. Not even beauty comes to the rescue as aestheticization is deemed 
inadequate in view of the enormity of destruction. Accepting the ubiquity of loss and 
decay is the precondition of this ethical project, which resigns itself, in a sober but 
unheroic fashion, to muddling through life while taking advantage of moments of 
positivity that emerge out of the fundamental serendipity of history. Strikingly, the Soviet 
context is hardly referenced specifically here, yet as he dismisses historical masterplots, 
the poet clearly also settles scores with the Soviet version. The messiness of his attitude 
to life is reflected, perhaps deliberately, in the embrace of contradictions (speech and 
silence, friendship and solitude, eternity and mortality, etc.), as if the requirement to be 
coherent would in itself smack of the kind of reductionism that has shaped historical 
illusions.  
Kushner, clearly, has no truck with Diderot's solipsism, nor with Hegel's bold narrative 
of progress, nor with Simmel's peaceful reconciliation with the creative forces of nature. 
Nor, really, does he intend primarily to bear witness to history, the way Benjamin's Angel 
does, in the faint anticipation of some transcendent totality. Indeed, forgoing the longing 
for totality, for a meta-narrative that ties us to a certain destiny, is at the heart of Kushner's 
project. In a poem called “The Course of Life,” Kushner seems almost to acknowledge 
the pointlessness of Benjamin’s Angel, using strikingly similar imagery. Life is 
“Irreparable, irretrievable, / Elusive, semelfactive” (“Nepopravima, nevozvratna, / 
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Neulovima, odnokratna”), and no one can escape its relentless course, which leads only 
to death: “No one will row back! / It is driven by obscure winds” (“Nikto ne vygrebet 
obratno! Vetrami temnymi gonima”). The poet can do no more than be transfixed by the 
contemplation of its vastness: “Its immense face, without make-up / Taking my leave, I 
scrutinize greedily. / Boundless and immense, / By what intercessor protected?” (“V litso 
ogromnoe, bez grima, / Proshchaias’, vsmatrivaius’ zhadno. / Neobozrima i gromadna, / 
Kakim zastupnikom khranima?”) (“Khod zhizni,” Pis’mo, Kushner 1997 99-100). The 
sublime spectacle of life is unfathomable, uncontrollable, and ungovernable; the winds 
that drive life forward are incomprehensible and not directed to progress; and no higher-
order being can assist humanity in making sense of its existence.  
Perhaps surprisingly, the position Kushner comes closest to is that of Burke, in the 
sense that the spectacle of devastation places a moral responsibility on us not to revel in 
destruction, but to seize erratic opportunities to re-affirm the few things that are positive 
– a scrap of memory, a sign of friendship, a piece of art, a brief line of poetry, a glance 
cast on a detail of the scenery outside. In so doing, Kushner posits the endurance of a 
community united not around a grand project, but around the idea of carrying on in the 
face of everything, muddling through despite the lack of hopes for a transformational 
future. We could call this stance stoic, but even this would risk making too much of it. I 
prefer to call it a commitment to micro-narratives, discrete and self-contained moments 
where something seems to make sense, even if only fleetingly. According to Ar’ev, the 
contemporary world for Kushner is “the world of private thoughts and fleetingly attentive 
observations. Like quicksand, its innumerable trifles swallow every global conception” 
(Ar’ev 2000, 175). Kushner puts it more figuratively: “I like the close-up of life, / Its 
unevenness, shiver / The flaw seen in it, / Like in a powerful microscope.” (“Mne dorog 
zhizni krupnyi plan, / Nerovnosti, oznob / I v nei uvidennyi iz’’ian, / Kak v sil’nyi 
mikroskop.”) (“Pridesh’ domoi, shursha plashchom,” Golos, Kushner 1997 167). 
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APPENDIX 
Literal English rendition of Kushner’s poems by Andreas Schönle. 
 
'In a slippery graveyard, alone', by Aleksandr 
Kushner 
 
In a slippery graveyard, alone 
Among broken tombstones, ruins 
That tore veins of marble, 
Rotten aspen trees, 
I stand at Tiutchev's grave. 
Can't tear myself away. 
Close to the Obvodnyi, among 
Factory walls, pressed tightly, 
Look: the almost forgotten 
'All-devouring abyss'. 
Here it is! Light from elsewhere, 
Pitifully coming out through the greenery? 
The inside-out of life? Chaos? No. 
The obsolete rubbish 
Of swept-off years, nothing but a dump. 
What graveyards we have! 
Their neglect  
A rejection of life and a rejection 
Of death, the interrupted singing 
Of two-three bird's phrases. 
In the sepulchral fields we roam, 
Dressed not in purple, but in tatters, 
Through back alleys. 
Give me a rubber, we'll erase: 
Not a line, not a trace of us left. 
A hundred of our years 
Can surpass the destruction 
Of a millenium: so many catastophies 
Have fallen, bombs, which have switched off      
                                                           the lights, 
Devastating night calls. 
To fall asleep, to get cold. 
After all, we wouldn't grow pretty flowers 
On these remains and rubble! 
If it was not for Tiutchev, perhaps 
They would have ploughed it over.  
Our entire character is in this 
And our rapture. 
Александр Кушнер, «На скользком кладбище, 
один» 
 
На скользком кладбище, один  
Средь плит расколотых, руин,  
Порвавших мраморные жилы,  
Гнилых осин,  
Стою у тютчевской могилы.  
Не отойти.  
Вблизи Обводного, среди  
Фабричных стен, прижатых тесно,  
Смотри: забытая почти  
"Всепоглощающая бездна".  
Так вот она! Нездешний свет,  
Сквозь зелень выбившийся жалко?  
Изнанка жизни? Хаос? Нет.  
Сметенных лет  
Изжитый мусор, просто свалка.  
Какие кладбища у нас!  
Их запустенье  
Отказ от жизни и отказ  
От смерти, птичьих двух-трех фраз  
В кустах оборванное пенье.  
В полях загробных мы бредем,  
Не в пурпур, в рубище одеты,  
Глухим путем. 
Резинку дай, мы так сотрем:  
Ни строчки нашей, ни приметы.  
Сто наших лет  
Тысячелетним разрушеньям  
Дать могут фору: столько бед  
Свалилось, бомб, гасивших свет,  
 
Звонков с ночным опустошеньем.  
Уснуть, остыть.  
Что ж, не цветочки ж разводить  
На этом прахе и развале!  
Когда б не Тютчев, может быть,  
Его б совсем перепахали.  
И в этом весь  
Характер наш и упоенье.  
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Is there a Kingdom of God? 
Does haughtiness grace the dead? 
Is humility in poetry insincere? 
Let's ask Tiutchev, he too 
Through eternal sleep 
Waves his hand and shrugs his shoulders. 
And it seems to me, he blesses 
His own deadly loss, among us. 
И разве царство божье здесь?  
И разве мертвых красит спесь?  
В стихах неискренно смиренье?  
Спросите Тютчева и он  
Сквозь вечный сон 
Махнет рукой, пожмет плечами.  
И мнится: смертный свой урон  
Благословляет, между нами.  
 
(“Na skol'zkom kladbishche, odin”, Golos, 
Kushner 1997 176-77) 
 
 
 
'Ruins', by Aleksandr Kushner 
 
For complete bliss only ruins  
Were missing and so they put them up 
In alleys from material 
Such that they look like chaos 
Of marble, dust, and rubble, 
Granite masonry and crumbling bricks. 
 
And they liked, climbing on the fragment,  
To stand on it and sigh, grief-stricken. 
Amids the diluted darkness of the North,  
Rose the mirage of Mycenea and the Parthenon  
The powdered descendant of Tatar hordes 
Revered Felten and Cameron. 
 
If only they had known, what 
Graves and destruction the world would see. 
From childhood remember the naked skeletons 
The stiff face of sorrow without expression. 
Ruins ... Let others admire 
How elder blooms among the dilapidation. 
 
I remember the destroyed neighbourhoods 
The rusted beams listing and hanging 
How horrible you are, ideals of yore 
How bitter, amorous partings 
And the sudden collapse of old friendships 
Desperation and disappointments! 
 
Here is a man who looks like a ruin, 
A gaping hole in his eyes. 
Александр Кушнер, «Руины» 
 
Для полного блаженства не хватало 
Руин, их потому и возводили 
В аллеях из такого матерьяла, 
Чтобы они на хаос походили, 
Из мрамора, из праха и развала, 
Гранитной кладки и кирпичной пыли. 
 
И нравилось, взобравшись на обломок, 
Стоять на нем, вздыхая сокрушённо. 
Средь северных разбавленных потёмок 
Всплывал мираж Микен и Парфенона. 
Татарских орд припудренный потомок 
И Фельтена ценил, и Камерона. 
 
Когда бы знать могли они, какие 
Увидит мир гробы и разрушенья! 
Я помню с детства остовы нагие, 
Застывший горя лик без выраженья. 
Руины… Пусть любуются другие, 
Как бузина цветет средь запустенья. 
 
Я помню те разбитые кварталы 
И ржавых балок крен и провисанье. 
Как вы страшны, былые идеалы, 
Как вы горьки, любовные прощанья 
И старых дружб мгновенные обвалы, 
Отчаянья и разочарованья!. 
 
Вот человек, похожий на руину. 
Зияние в его глазах разверстых. 
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Such a breach, and wound, and avalanche 
You won't see in the Dresdens and the Brests. 
Even home grew repellent to the ravaged son 
And there is no oblivion in departures.  
 
Friends, hold on to the railings, 
To this bush, to paintings, to a line 
To the best we had in life 
To the inconsistency of misery and interruption 
This temple was destroyed not by lighting, 
It was conceived in this way. Let's put a stop. 
 
In this meticulously correct wreck 
Why seek another, bloody and rusty? 
We know where to find the ruins, in the past. 
And the future, perhaps, is beside the point. 
Go away, ragged ghost, in the haze of the northern 
lights, 
Or stay here, but as a childish amusement. 
 
Такую брешь, и рану, и лавину 
Не встретишь ты ни в Дрезденах, ни в Брестах. 
И дом постыл разрушенному сыну, 
И нет ему забвения в отъездах. 
 
Друзья мои, держитесь за перила, 
За этот куст, за живопись, за строчку, 
За лучшее, что с нами в жизни было, 
За сбивчивость беды и проволочку, 
А этот храм не молния разбила, 
Он так задуман был. Поставим точку. 
 
В развале этом, правильно-дотошном, 
Зачем искать другой, кроваво-ржавый? 
Мы знаем, где искать руины: в прошлом. 
А будущее ни при чём, пожалуй. 
Сгинь, рваный призрак, в мареве сполошном! 
 
Останься здесь, но детскою забавой. 
 
(“Ruiny”, Golos, Kushner 1997 159-160) 
 
 
 
